The Black Sea Region in the Context of the Russian-Ukrainian War

Leading global think tanks are paying close attention to the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the situation on the continent. According to Western experts, Russia has held the strongest position in the Black Sea region since 1991, and Moscow is ready to strengthen it even further, especially if the war ends in its favor.

The Black Sea is of enormous geopolitical and geo-economic importance. Located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, its future and that of the entire Black Sea region depends on the outcome of Russia’s war against Ukraine. With costs rising and diplomatic efforts intensifying, a ceasefire – though not the end of the struggle for Ukraine’s future – seems more likely, even though Russia has not backed down from its maximalist political demands.

With US President Donald Trump still unwilling to give up on mediating an end to the war, it is important to consider how different scenarios could affect the long-term future of the Black Sea region.

The Black Sea Region in the Context of the Russian-Ukrainian War

Russia has been advancing territorially and politically in the Black Sea region for more than 20 years, patiently but steadily rebuilding the influence it lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Its current strategic position there is stronger than at any time since 1991. This has come after decades of conventional military operations and hybrid wars aimed at bringing new territories under Russia’s influence or control.

Ukraine is the most glaring case, as Moscow has occupied nearly 20 percent of its territory. The RF’s control of Crimea, with its resource-rich territorial waters and exclusive economic zone (EEZ), as well as the Donbas, could potentially increase its mineral wealth by trillions of dollars. Russia remains deeply entrenched in Transnistria and has a certain degree of influence in Moldova, Georgia, Bulgaria, Romania, and even Türkiye.

There is a widespread belief that the end of the war is, by definition, a victory for peace, regardless of what that end may be. Many experts argue that Vladimir Putin has lost the battle in the Black Sea and is losing his war against Ukraine, given the staggering military, human, economic, political, reputational, and other losses for Russia, and that he is seeking to compensate at the negotiating table for what the RF has lost on the battlefield. After all, the Kremlin leader and his generals have been humiliated: the Russian army has lost more than one million people in the killed and wounded, and about a third of the Black Sea Fleet’s vessels have been sunk or damaged. The economy is in a dire state, and Vladimir Putin himself has been issued an arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court for war crimes.

The end of the war would be a positive development, but the facts suggest otherwise. Russia’s gains are of enormous strategic importance and will increase even further if President Putin ends the war on his terms. Without significant pressure from the West, impressive victories by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, or changes in Russian leadership and state policy, this war is likely to secure a number of geopolitical and geoeconomic benefits for Moscow. These include not only territory and a favorable position in the Black Sea region, but also recognition by the United States as an equal partner – a status that Vladimir Putin seeks. Russia’s achievements have already shifted the balance of power in the region, and their impact could increase if the Russian president achieves his ultimate goals.

Likely Outcome in Russia’s Favor

Despite the impressive successes of Ukrainian troops in containing and wearing down the Russian army for nearly four years, Ukraine is unlikely to regain all the territory illegally seized by Russia in the near future. Most scenarios for the final stage of the war reflect strategic gains for Moscow and losses for Kyiv.

The first scenario is a negotiated ceasefire or truce with a frozen conflict. This would freeze the line of contact, giving Russia long-term control over significant areas of Ukrainian territory, possibly under the supervision of something like a “peace council”,  as in the Gaza Strip, or with a demilitarized zone. The other is a negotiated ceasefire or truce with Russia, which would control the entire Donetsk region. Ukraine has rejected this option as unacceptable because it includes territory that Russia has not captured, and because of the lack of a promise of NATO membership or weak security guarantees. The third scenario involves a negotiated ceasefire or truce that would result in a “draw” for both sides, which neither wants.

An even worse scenario is a Russian breakthrough achieved by exhausting Ukraine, or a crisis in the Ukrainian leadership that would force Kyiv to ask for peace. Finally, there is a hypothetical possibility that Russia would achieve a victory that includes surrender and the resolution of “root reasons” and other long-standing Kremlin demands. However, these scenarios are unacceptable to Ukraine.

Scenarios favorable to Ukraine depend on factors that currently seem less likely, such as a significant increase in military support and economic pressure from the West, serious mistakes or losses by Russia, economic or political instability, or a coup in Moscow. However, since November 2022, Ukraine has lost only about 1 percent of its territory, while inflicting huge losses on the Russians. This suggests that Kyiv can keep further losses within reasonable limits while continuing to inflict significant economic damage on Russia’s deep rear.

None of these scenarios envisages a “victory” for Russia or a “defeat” for Ukraine in the traditional sense, but all of them leave the Kremlin in a more advantageous position in the region, both territorially and strategically, than it was 20 years ago. In fact, the overall balance of power looks quite favorable from the Kremlin’s point of view, so we can expect Vladimir Putin to promote the following narratives about his achievements:

1.  20 percent of Ukraine’s territory that Russia did not control before 2014 has been occupied, including Crimea, the vast riches of the Donbas, and part of the EEZ;
2. Moscow has “formed” a government in Georgia that promotes Russian interests and exerts significant influence (if not control) over the entire eastern coast;
3. a “victory” has been won over NATO, the EU, and the USA, even though none of them were directly involved in the war;
4. differences between the USa and Europe, as well as within NATO, have been exacerbated, with some member states failing to meet their 5% defense spending commitments and not supporting the campaign of maximum pressure on Moscow, while sending more hard currency to Russia than is going to support Ukraine;
5. discord and division have been sown among NATO member states, with pro-Russian parties strengthening their positions in some of them.
6. economic ties have had a “positive” impact on Türkiye, despite its negative attitude to the occupation of Crimea.

Although Vladimir Putin would not say so directly, he would be satisfied that he remains alive and continues to rule Russia as a unitary state.

Northern Coast

In the northern coastal zone, Russia’s occupation of Crimea is an extremely valuable military and geopolitical asset. From there, Russia could more easily continue to project its power into the Black Sea and beyond, even if a third of its Black Sea Fleet is destroyed, weakened, or blocked in Novorossiysk, if the oil terminals in the port of Tuapse are damaged, and the oil tankers that have so far sailed fairly freely in the Black Sea are sunk. It will be very difficult to drive Russia’s main military forces out of Crimea, and reinforcements for the Black Sea Fleet are likely to return to Crimea after the war ends [2].

The Kremlin continues to exert full pressure on Moldova, despite the fact that in September last year the majority of voters there chose a pro-European course. Russia still has significant influence in the country through pro-Moscow politicians and voters (not only in the Russian-speaking region of Gagauzia), and it can be expected that it will continue to use a range of hybrid tools to weaken the government’s policies. A nightmare scenario for Romania – Russian control over Ukrainian territory up to Transnistria (including Moldova), which would essentially make Russia a neighboring country – is currently unlikely, but it remains one of Moscow’s goals.

Ukraine controls enough of the northern coast to have sea access to world markets. Russia’s goal of controlling Odessa and the entire coastline to the Romanian border remains a distant dream. However, on December 2, 2025, Vladimir Putin again expressed his interest in cutting Ukraine off from the sea and capturing Odesa, which he calls a “Russian city”. Moscow controls a significant part of the coast east of Odesa, the entire Sea of Azov, and the Kerch Strait. Those waters, which were previously free for navigation, are no longer so, despite Moscow’s signing of the 2003 Treaty on the Legal Status of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait.

It is important to remember the Kremlin mentality, reflected in the works of the ideologist and propagandist of the “Russian world” Aleksandr Dugin: “The absolute imperative of Russian geopolitics on the Black Sea coast is Moscow’s total and unlimited control over its entire length – from Ukrainian to Abkhazian territories. One can divide this entire zone as much as one likes along ethnic and cultural lines – granting ethnic and religious autonomy to the Crimean Little Russians, Tatars, Cossacks, Abkhazians, Georgians, etc. – but all this is only possible with Moscow’s absolute control over the military and political situation. These sectors must be radically separated from thalassocratic influence [3] – both from the West and from Türkiye (or even Greece). The northern coast of the Black Sea must be exclusively Eurasian and centrally subordinate to Moscow [4].

Eastern Coast

Russia’s creeping takeover of Georgia has been a major success for President Vladimir Putin, even though millions of Georgians dispute the dominance of the ruling Georgian Dream party. It is too early to say that Georgia is “lost”,  but events have been developing in a negative direction for years, and the prospects are quite challenging.

Russia’s domination in Abkhazia and its naval base in Ochamchira give Moscow significant influence, if not control, over the entire coastline up to Türkiye’s border. China is also trying to expand its influence in Georgia, although its attempt to build a deep-water port in Anaklia has reached an impasse. Moscow may not want a port with such significant Chinese involvement, no matter how “brotherly” its relations with Beijing may be.

Western Coast

The Kremlin continues to use its numerous assets in Bulgaria, including pro-Moscow parties and individual politicians, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, historical economic ties and pro-Russian sentiments, as well as hybrid warfare tools to undermine this critically important NATO member state. Nevertheless, the latest governments there remain firmly pro-NATO and pro-European, and the electorate clearly favors the West. The government’s takeover of the Lukoil oil refinery in November 2025 and the US administration’s sanctions against the company were important steps in reducing Russia’s malign influence, but much remains unchanged. Bulgaria does not pay as much attention to Black Sea security as Ukraine or Romania. Sofia views the Black Sea more as a tourist destination than a source of problems, even after Russia closed parts of the Bulgarian EEZ for naval exercises and conducted inspections of merchant ships there.

The Kremlin continues to fuel and exploit public discontent in Romania, which has long been a bastion of pro-NATO and pro-European policies. Moscow has significant influence in the hierarchy of the Romanian Orthodox Church and among believers, as well as among supporters of the right-wing Alliance for the Union of Romanians party, which leads in the polls and is currently approaching 40% popularity.

Russia is increasingly violating Romania’s sovereignty. The country’s Ministry of National Defense has pointed out that since 2022, Russian drones have carried out about 50 strikes near the Ukrainian border. In 30 of those cases, UAV debris was found on Romanian territory. On August 28, 2025, a Russian naval drone struck a Ukrainian vessel 30 kilometers up the Danube from the Black Sea coast, on the Romanian border. These incidents attract much less attention than Russian provocations against the sovereignty of Poland, the Baltic states, and Northern Europe, but they are no less alarming.

Corridor to Central Europe

If President Putin ends the war on his terms, Russia’s influence is likely to grow in Bulgaria and Romania. Russian efforts to weaken or “capture” key state institutions, or to support pro-Moscow forces, could eventually create a corridor of instability stretching from the Black Sea coast to the heart of Europe, through North Macedonia and Serbia to Hungary and Slovakia. The governments of those three countries are open to the Kremlin’s interests or even loyal to them.

This outcome is not inevitable, but a negative outcome of the war would reinforce unfavorable trends in the Black Sea region and facilitate the Kremlin’s penetration into what Vladimir Putin considers NATO’s potential “soft underbelly”.  Such a development would demonstrate once again that Russia can successfully compete with NATO’s interests deep within the Alliance’s territory. It would also signal to China, which is increasingly active in the Black Sea region, that the countries in this region are open to its malign influence.

Southern Coast

The Kremlin has not directly challenged Türkiye’s core interests in the Black Sea region, and the two countries continue to enjoy beneficial economic relations. Ankara has generally played a positive diplomatic role in the war. However, Türkiye should be wary of Moscow’s significant expansion of its sphere of influence in the Black Sea region, especially after the recent attacks on three Turkish ships in Ukrainian ports. Ankara is unlikely to change its diplomatic recognition of the territorial integrity of Ukraine and Georgia. Nevertheless, as long as Russia respects Türkiye’s role in the southern Black Sea region and as the “guardian of the straits” [5], and offers attractive economic ties, Ankara’s pragmatic approach to Moscow is likely to continue.

Türkiye is likely to continue to strictly adhere to the Montreux Convention [6] as long as the war continues. It could improve regional security in the Black Sea by stepping up demining and other joint efforts with Bulgaria and Romania, as well as by selling ships to the Romanian Navy. Ankara can do little to prevent the Kremlin from using Crimea to project power in the region, but it can reduce Russian militarization of the Black Sea by using the Convention to prevent Russia from restoring its Black Sea Fleet to its pre-war size.

The Importance of the Black Sea for Energy Security and Transport Accessibility

At the moment the  Black Sea is neither free nor open, even though merchant ships are sailing its waters. Ships carrying grain and other goods to and from Ukraine are forced to stay close to the coasts of Romania and Bulgaria to reduce the risk of Russia’s attacks and sea mines. Ukraine, for its part, has recently sank three ships belonging to Russia’s “shadow fleet”. Although the Black Sea Fleet remains confined to Novorossiysk, it still poses a threat. Once hostilities are over, Moscow would have significant opportunities to create risks for maritime transport or interfere with the activities of other states.

The large natural gas reserves in the Black Sea – in the territorial waters or EEZs of Romania, Bulgaria, and Türkiye – need to be developed, as they are essential for the growth of their economies, reducing dependence on Russian fuel sources, and strengthening European energy security. In the Black Sea region, where Russia’s influence is so strong, the Middle Corridor [7] may become less successful as a trade route connecting Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe.

Romania will be the largest gas producer in the EU in 2027, when it begins operating the 7,500 km² Neptun Deep field, which contains approximately 100 billion m³ with an annual production of 7-8 billion m³. The country has been producing gas for several years under the Midea project (with US investment). When Bulgaria begins to exploit approximately 60 billion m³ at its Khan Tervel and Khan Asparuh fields, it will be able to cover all its domestic production and exports to the region.

The Sakarya field in Türkiye contains approximately 540 billion m³, which is the largest gas reserve in the Black Sea. Türkiye has also served as the main transit route for Russian gas and oil, which it processes in several locations. It is no secret that this fuel is of Russian origin, but it is still traded openly, reflecting market conditions and Europe’s continuing reluctance to sever ties with Russia. Russia controls a significant portion of Ukraine’s vast offshore gas reserves and uses captured drilling platforms for both military and energy purposes.

Senior officials in Romania and Bulgaria expect the Kremlin to use hybrid measures to prevent the exploitation of their reserves, many of which are located in the EEZ. They are not covered by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, so they are easier to disrupt. Russia has interfered in drilling areas in the past. Neither country has sufficient naval forces to prevent interference in the development of resources, the exploitation of which is very expensive and vulnerable during drilling and the construction of other infrastructure. Moscow is less inclined to interfere in the exploitation of Türkiye’s Black Sea energy resources, given its pragmatic relationship with Ankara.

A peaceful and stable Black Sea region can contribute to European energy security thanks to an underwater power cable that will be laid with the participation of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Hungary, and Romania. Two “Turkish Stream” gas pipelines and several data cables cross the Black Sea, strengthening the connection with the Middle Corridor. Bulgaria’s decision to terminate Russian gas transit contracts from January 1, 2026, to completely exit the Russian gas market by 2028, and to switch to imported liquefied natural gas is an important step forward in reducing Moscow’s ability to blackmail Sofia.

Scenarios

The future of the Black Sea region depends on how Russia’s war against Ukraine ends. The stakes are highest for Ukraine, but they are significant for every other Black Sea state and for those outside the narrow geographical zone – the Caucasus, the Balkans, and beyond, and in some scenarios, even Central Europe. The question is how NATO and the EU will respond to these new geopolitical realities.

The Russian-Ukrainian war has higher stakes than Vladimir Putin’s stated goal of returning the country to Russia’s sphere of influence – a strategy he considers necessary for his efforts to restore Russia’s status and  project power into neighboring territories and onto the world stage. Ukraine and the Black Sea region are also key battlegrounds in his efforts to shape a new international order alongside China, Iran (another potentially key player in the Black Sea region), and others. While the West pays much deserved attention to the Baltic region, Russia views the Black Sea as the most strategically important and vulnerable region on its borders. It remains the most important “laboratory” for the Kremlin, where it practices combined kinetic/hybrid warfare against the West.

Probable Scenario: Deterioration of Security

Unless there are major changes in Ukraine and Russia, the security situation in the wider Black Sea region is likely to deteriorate further, especially if the war ends on Vladimir Putin’s terms. Although the end of the “hot” phase of the war is likely to be generally welcomed, the Kremlin’s control over such a large number of strategically important territories would strengthen its geopolitical position. This cannot help having negative consequences for all coastal states and beyond. It is unlikely that conditions will return to what they were before 2008 – Moscow will not give up the territories it has illegally seized. This may well affect activity in the Middle Corridor, and China will have a greater presence in the Black Sea region.

Moderately Likely Scenario: NATO and EU Countermeasures

NATO and the EU may begin to pay more attention to the Black Sea in order to counter Russian and Chinese activities more vigorously and strengthen their deterrence. Although the EU, France, and the USA have increased their focus on the region in recent months, many other priorities compete for their attention and resources. More active European involvement is critical, as the Donald Trump administration has made it clear that it cannot take on more responsibility for regional security in the Black Sea than the Europeans.

Less Likely Scenario: the USA’s More Active Involvement

More active involvement of the USA seems unlikely, as it already has significant commitments through NATO in Romania, Bulgaria, and Türkiye, and is currently prioritizing other regions and issues. Georgia needs more attention from the EU and the USA, but Brussels and Washington have approached the region in recent years in a way that has diminished their influence.

Ankara could play a positive role as the “guardian of the straits” by seeking to demilitarize the Black Sea, as it did for a short period after the Crimean War (1853-1856), by preventing Russian warships from passing through the straits to rebuild the Black Sea Fleet. However, the likelihood of conflict with Moscow in this context seems low, even if Türkiye’s leaders would prefer a smaller Russian naval presence in the Black Sea. This aspect should be discussed at the 2026 NATO summit in Ankara.

Volodymyr Palyvoda,
expert in international relations

(Image generated by neural network)

Notes:

[1] An international transitional body authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 2803 of November 2025 to support the administration, reconstruction, and economic recovery of the Gaza Strip after the completion of Israel’s military operation. The resolution also allows for the deployment of a multinational peacekeeping force there.
[2] Units of the Russian Black Sea Fleet are actively participating in the so-called “special military operation”: The 810^th  Marine Brigade, as well as submarines, landing ships, and aircraft, provide fire support from the sea, strike coastal targets, control maritime communications, and support amphibious landings.
[3] The influence of sea powers or civilizations (from the Greek words “thalassa” — sea, “kratos” — power), where economic, political, and cultural life is centered around the sea, shipping, and control of sea spaces, often determined by geographical location and defining historical development and world politics.
[4] Aleksandr Dugin. “Fundamentals of Geopolitics. The Geopolitical Future of Russia.” Moscow: Arktogeya, 1997.
[5] Black Sea Straits – the established name for the system of maritime waterways from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, consisting of the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles, and the Sea of Marmara, which connects them.
[6] The Convention on the Regime of the Straits is an international agreement that restored Turkey’s sovereignty over the Black Sea Straits in 1936 and regulates maritime traffic between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea through these straits. In peacetime, the Convention guarantees complete freedom of passage for all civilian vessels and restricts the number, tonnage, and armament of military vessels, with specific provisions governing their entry and duration of stay. During a war in which Türkiye is not involved, military ships of states at war may not pass through the straits, except when returning to their base.
[7] The Middle Corridor or Trans-Caspian International Transport Route is a multimodal logistics route that connects China and Europe, bypassing Russia, passing through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye, and then on to the EU. It is an alternative to traditional routes through Russia and is becoming increasingly relevant in the context of geopolitical changes.