Russia’s Energy War Against Ukraine. The “Cold” and “Hot” Phases and Their Consequences
This winter has been the most difficult for Ukraine since the beginning of the war. Moscow is trying to destroy our country’s energy system in order to force us to surrender.
As part of its actions, Russia is exploiting the sharp cold snap, hoping that a humanitarian catastrophe will arise in Ukraine that could undermine it from within.
However, this is nothing new to us. Moscow has been using energy as a tool of its foreign policy since the 1990s. Now it has, so to speak, moved from the “cold” to the “hot” phase of the energy war.
With these actions, Russia has created significant problems for Ukraine, but has not been able to break it. Ukraine has stood its ground, while Russia has lost the opportunity to become a “great energy power” and its oil and gas revenues.
The main problem for Ukraine in January and early February of this year was its energy crisis, which began to threaten a humanitarian catastrophe. As is well known, it arose as a result of Russia’s targeted strikes on our country’s energy system. These attacks became especially intense during the severe frosts.
In principle, this question is understandable. Russia cannot achieve success on the front lines and force Ukraine to capitulate. Therefore, it is trying to undermine our country from within, creating unbearable living conditions for the population. Moscow hopes that this will provoke by Ukrainians’ mass protests demanding that the authorities agree to Russia’s terms of “peace”, which de facto would mean liquidation of Ukraine’s sovereignty.
However, Russia’s aspirations are not surprising. It began doing this in the autumn of 2022 and continues to do so today. In fact, Russia is waging a full-scale energy war against Ukraine, which is part of the overall war. In the current situation, this component is no less important than the purely military one. Moreover, it can be perceived as a weapon of mass destruction. This is especially true in winter, when freezing temperatures make it especially effective. This was confirmed by today’s situation, when Russia deliberately began striking Ukraine’s energy sector during a sharp cold snap. As a result, millions of our citizens, including the elderly, the sick, and children, were left without light and heat. It is precisely these people that Putin’s regime is fighting, since the “second army of the world” is unable to achieve victory in fair battles on the front lines. This is evidenced by the slow pace of the Russian army’s advance in January this year, which was the slowest since the beginning of last year. Russia is unable to restore them to their previous level in the short term, as it has exhausted most of its strategic reserves, which were put into action in October-November 2025 with the aim of achieving a breakthrough in the war.
At that time, this issue became particularly important for Russia, as it was linked to the intensification of peace talks. Therefore, Moscow tried to strengthen its negotiating position by demonstrating its military superiority over Ukraine and its ability to achieve its goals. At the same time, the spread of the economic crisis in Russia began to reduce its ability to continue the war and required a reduction in military spending.
However, Putin cannot end the war without achieving at least his minimum goals, as this would deal a powerful blow to his personal ambitions and power. That is why he began demanding that Russia be given the entire territory of the Donbas as the main condition for suspending hostilities.
In January of this year, these issues reached a whole new level for Moscow as a result of US President Donald Trump’s shift to more decisive action. He demonstrated this with Venezuela and increased pressure on Russia, demanding that it end the war in Ukraine. The crisis in the Russian economy also accelerated. Besides, Russia couldn’t achieve a breakthrough on the front, and therefore rushed to take advantage of the cold weather in the interests mentioned above. In other words, it followed in the footsteps of Hitler’s Germany, which tried to freeze the besieged city of Leningrad and its inhabitants in the winter of 1941-1942. In this regard, Putin’s participation in the events dedicated to the 82nd anniversary of the lifting of the blockade of the city on January 27 this year was frankly cynical.
What happened to Hitler’s Germany then is common knowledge. It is obvious that Putin’s Russia, which completely copies such actions, will suffer the same fate. Therefore, it is worth considering this situation using the example of energy wars and their consequences for Moscow.
To begin with, Russia launched energy wars against Ukraine back in the early 1990s, taking advantage of the latter’s dependence on Russian energy resources. This primarily concerned natural gas, as Ukraine itself produced only insignificant amounts and had neither the technical capabilities to access alternative sources of “blue fuel” nor the funds to create them. This gave Moscow leverage to exert energy or gas pressure on Ukraine, which was used to keep Ukraine within Russia’s sphere of influence and create obstacles to our European and Euro-Atlantic integration, as well as to take control of the most important assets of the Ukrainian economy and military components. To increase their effectiveness, Russia created an artificial problem of Ukraine’s debt for Russian gas. In reality, there was no debt, as Russia sold gas to Ukraine at inflated prices and refused to pay Ukraine adequately for its services in transporting gas to Europe.
At that time, Ukraine could not defend its interests because its position was hopeless. In addition, the system used at that time for Ukraine to purchase gas from Russia and transport it to Europe facilitated various corruption schemes involving certain representatives of the Ukrainian government and business community. Therefore, they were not only uninterested in Ukraine switching to alternative gas sources, but also obstructed this process.
The issue of gas debts as a means of exerting pressure on Ukraine was first raised by the Russian company Gazprom, but, in fact, by the Russian government, in February 1993. The company’s management threatened to suspend gas supplies to Ukraine due to its debt. In reality, Moscow was seeking concessions from Ukraine on the distribution of the former USSR’s Black Sea Fleet, as well as seeking to undermine Ukraine’s ability to counter separatism in Crimea, which the RF was actively provoking.
However, Moscow failed to achieve the desired. Ukraine’s leadership took a firm stance and, in turn, promised Russia to block the transit of Russian gas to Europe. The conflict was soon resolved, but Moscow did not give up the use of energy as a means of influencing Ukraine.
In August 1993, again under the pretext of Ukraine’s failure to pay its debts, Russia once again suspended its gas supplies. At the same time, it accused Ukraine of unauthorized gas withdrawals and began demanding that a number of Ukrainian gas transportation system facilities be leased to it. Incidentally, Moscow continued to press Ukraine for concessions in the matter of the Black Sea Fleet’s distribution.
The next stage of the gas conflict was resolved by restructuring Ukraine’s debt, which Russia had imposed on it. However, Ukraine was forced to agree to the unfavorable terms of the so-called Massandra agreements, signed in September 1993, which provided for the division not only of the Black Sea Fleet’s ships, but also of its coastal infrastructure on a 50/50 basis.
Russia perceived this as a sign of Ukraine’s weakness and continued to exert pressure through the energy sector. In February-March 1994, Moscow again stopped gas supplies to Ukraine and announced new demands for debt repayment in the form of the transfer of Ukraine’s gas transportation system (GTS) to Russia. Ukraine again rejected this, but agreed to Moscow’s claims to the foreign assets of the former USSR and made further concessions regarding the Black Sea Fleet.
In April 1994, the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine signed an agreement on the phased settlement of the Black Sea Fleet issue. Ukraine received less than 20% of its fleet, rather than 50% as previously agreed.
In exchange for these concessions, Russia guaranteed Ukraine gas supplies for 1995-1996. Therefore, those years were relatively calm. In addition, the then Ukrainian leadership bowed to Russia and began to surrender Ukraine’s interests. This was exactly what Russia wanted.
Thus, in May 1997, a set of agreements was signed on the terms of the Black Sea Fleet, now Russian, staying on the territory of Ukraine. The Fleet was granted the right to remain in Crimea until 2017. The Black Sea Fleet’s rent for military bases in Crimea was paid off with Ukraine’s gas debts. As we know, in 2014, it was the Russian Black Sea Fleet that was the first wave of Russian forces to occupy Crimea.
The government of Ukraine kept going with this policy from 1998 to 2001. For alleged gas debts, it transferred to Russia eight Tu-160 and three Tu-95MS missile-carrying bombers, about 600 X-22 cruise missiles that were in their arsenal, as well as various ground equipment. Since 2022, Russia has been using all of this in the war against Ukraine.
Ukraine’s concessions prompted Moscow to take more active steps to establish control over the Ukrainian gas transportation system, which was strategically important for Russia. By acquiring ownership of it, Moscow would be able to enter the European market without Ukraine’s mediation and would not have to pay Ukraine for the transportation of Russian gas. Ukraine would no longer be able to influence Russia due to its dependence on Ukrainian transit services.
To this end, Moscow launched a massive political and information campaign to force Ukraine to transfer its gas transportation system to Russia. As before, these actions were accompanied by threats to cut off gas supplies to Ukraine due to alleged unpaid debts.
Eventually, the Ukrainian government agreed to transfer the Ukrainian gas transportation system to Russia in exchange for its promise to supply gas at reduced prices until 2009. At this, the issue of reducing gas prices was actively used by Moscow as part of an information campaign to support pro-Russian forces in Ukraine on the eve of the 2004 presidential elections. However, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine at the end of that year had a significant impact on the situation.
The victory of national-democratic forces in Ukraine opened a new era in the development of our state: the transition to the practical implementation of accession to NATO and the EU. Russia reacted sharply negatively to this. It began to actively pressure Ukraine, using methods of “hybrid warfare”, in the energy sector included. This is evidenced by Russia’s “gas wars” against Ukraine in 2005-2009, which were aimed at forcing the leadership of our state to abandon the course of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. The same war was waged against Europe with the aim of getting it to stop supporting Ukraine.
As part of the implementation of these intentions, in March 2005 Gazprom raised the price of gas for Ukraine to the European level – about $250 per thousand cubic meters. These actions were openly political in nature and were not justified by any objective economic reasons. In view of this, the Ukrainian government rejected Russia’s demands. In response, on January 1, 2006, Gazprom stopped gas supplies to Ukraine. As a result, gas supplies to the EU were also reduced, forcing it to intervene in the situation as a mediator between Ukraine and Russia. Soon, the parties signed an agreement setting a temporary price for gas for Ukraine at $95 per thousand cubic meters.
Although the conflict was resolved, it demonstrated how Russia can use energy, or, in fact, an “energy weapon”, as a tool to implement its foreign policy. On the one hand, this forced Europe to make concessions to Russia, and on the other, it became a powerful incentive for the EU to reduce its energy dependence on Russia. Therefore, EU leaders began actively seeking access to alternative energy sources and means of transporting them. One such search effort was the latest round of Russia’s “gas war” against Ukraine in the winter of 2008-2009. It was similar in nature, but was mainly aimed at undermining the position of Ukraine’s national-democratic government in the run-up to the 2009 presidential elections in the country. Unfortunately, Russia succeeded in this. The new Ukrainian government became purely pro-Russian in nature and turned Ukraine towards Russia. Russia immediately took advantage of this and intensified its struggle for Ukraine’s gas transportation system.
However, Ukraine’s “Revolution of Dignity” in the winter of 2013-2014 allowed our country to resume its course of European and Euro-Atlantic integration and thwart Moscow’s plans. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and occupation of the Donbas became powerful incentives for Ukraine to eliminate its dependence on Russia in all areas, including the rejection of Russian gas. Already in 2014-2015, Ukraine completely switched to reverse gas supplies from Europe, although it stopped the transit of Russian gas to Europe.
Russia’s attack on Ukraine was perceived by Europe as a threat to its own security, prompting it to take more active steps to give up Russian energy carriers. By the 2020s, this issue had largely been resolved. In this regard, the most important factor was the commissioning of marine terminals for receiving liquefied natural gas (LNG), which enabled EU countries to gradually abandon Russian gas supplies. LNG began to be supplied from the USA, Qatar, and other countries. In addition, the energy networks and markets of European countries were integrated, and energy-saving and green technologies began to be used on a massive scale.
As a result, Russia lost the ability to use energy as a lever against both Ukraine and Europe. Therefore, it played virtually no significant role in Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine. This enabled Europe to exert powerful pressure on Russia by introducing and gradually increasing sanctions. The main sanctions concerned energy and included: refusing to purchase oil and gas supplied by pipelines from Russia; imposing a ban on European countries importing Russian oil transported by tankers above a price level set by the EU; and expanding the ban on cooperation with Russia in the energy sector.
The European Union’s sanctions were supplemented by the USA, which imposed its own restrictions on the Russian energy sector. Not all of them were effective and did not take effect immediately, but they did lead to a decline in Russia’s oil and gas revenues.
However, the most effective measures were those taken by US President Donald Trump to weaken Russia as America’s military adversary and competitor in the global energy market. Under his orders, oil production in the USA increased sharply, and agreements were reached with Saudi Arabia and a number of other OPEC members, who also increased their production. This resulted in an oil surplus on the global market and a drop in oil prices.
Trump’s actions caused greater damage to the Russian economy than all previous sanctions combined. In addition, he forced Europe to completely give up Russian oil and gas by 2027 and switch to using exclusively American energy carriers. Later, D. Trump imposed sanctions on Russian oil companies Rosneft and Lukoil. On this basis, he also persuaded Türkiye to give up Russian oil, and is now encouraging China and India to do the same.
All this can be called a “cold energy war” that has been and continues to be waged between Russia and its opponents without physical impact on energy infrastructure. In 2022, Russia added a “hot” form of such a war: strikes on Ukraine’s electricity and heat generating facilities, substations, and other energy facilities.
Over the course of four years, Russia has managed to significantly damage Ukraine’s energy system. In particular, all of our country’s main power plants, except for nuclear ones, were destroyed, and most of the main thermal power plants were damaged. And in January 2026, Russia was able to destabilize the entire energy system of Ukraine, bringing it closer to a critical state. At the same time, Russia deliberately violated the “energy truce”, which was supposed to begin in early February this year, according to an agreement between Ukraine and Russia mediated by the United States.
Ukraine did not become a debtor in this matter. In 2025, it intensified its strikes on oil refineries, oil terminals in the Black and Baltic Seas, and Russian oil depots. By the end of the year, about 30% of Russian oil refineries had been damaged. And in the second half of the year, Ukraine began to blow up tankers of the “shadow fleet” in the Black Sea.
In January 2026, the United States in the Caribbean Sea and North Atlantic, and the United Kingdom, France, and Germany in the Baltic Sea also joined in blocking the Russian “shadow fleet”, Fourteen other European countries issued a joint warning about tougher measures against ships engaged in illegal transportation in the interests of Russia.
Our strikes on energy facilities in the cities of Belgorod and Orel, as well as in the Kursk and Bryansk regions, prove that Ukraine can leave Russians without light and heat, just as Russia does to Ukrainians. But we do not do this on a massive scale because, unlike the Russian aggressors, we do not wage war on the civilian population.
Incidentally, there is no need to destroy Russia’s energy system. It is collapsing without any influence from Ukraine and its Western partners. In January this year, as a result of accidents at thermal power plants, the collapse of pylons and broken wires on power lines, and breaks in heating mains, parts of Moscow region, the city of Murmansk and Murmansk region, the city of Irkutsk and a number of other cities and regions, as well as the main base of the Russian Northern Fleet in the city of Severomorsk, were left without electricity and heat.
Instead of repairing its electrical and thermal infrastructure, Russia is spending money on war. As a result, its energy sector is collapsing, most likely irreversibly. According to Russian experts’ estimates, it will take about 20 trillion rubles to restore it, which it will not have even after the war ends.
Thus, since the 1990s, Russia has purposefully used its energy potential as a tool to implement its foreign policy towards Ukraine, Europe, and the post-Soviet countries.
Until the 2010s, Moscow’s activities took the form of a “cold energy war” and yielded certain results. However, subsequent measures taken by Ukraine, the EU, and other countries to reduce their energy dependence on Russia deprived it of this opportunity.
As a result, Russia was unable to use the energy factor in its war against Ukraine. Moreover, due to sanctions and other measures imposed by the USA and the EU, it lost its most important European market and may be pushed out of the Indian and Chinese markets as well.
In this situation, Moscow moved to the “hot” phase of the energy war, striking Ukraine’s energy system, which, although critical, was not destroyed. Ukraine survived even under extremely difficult winter conditions. In other words, Russia’s attempts to transform itself into a “great energy power” capable of dictating its will to others through the use of energy have completely failed. At best, it can become an energy appendage of China.
In addition, the events that took place during Russia’s energy war against Ukraine and are taking place now have become yet another confirmation that the Russians do not fulfill their promises and obligations. Therefore, it will be impossible to trust any peaceful agreements with it.
Yurii Ilchenko,
Institute for Global Politics
Photo EPA/MAXYM MARUSENKO
